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Abstract
Theories can be produced by experts seeking a reputation for having knowl-
edge. Hence, a tester could anticipate that theories may have been strategically
produced by uninformed experts who want to pass an empirical test.
We show that, with no restriction on the domain of permissible theories,
strategic experts cannot be discredited for an arbitrary but given number of
periods, no matter which test is used (provided that the test does not reject
the actual data-generating process).
Natural ways around this impossibility result include 1) assuming that un-
bounded data sets are available and 2) restricting the domain of permissible
theories (opening the possibility that the actual data-generating process is re-
jected out of hand). In both cases, it is possible to dismiss strategic experts,
but only to a limited extent. These results show signiﬁcant limits on what data
can accomplish when experts produce theories strategically.
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The production and transmission of knowledgep l a yac e n t r a lr o l ei ne c o n o m i ca c t i v i t y
(Hayek (1945)). Knowledge, however, is often structured as a theory which must be
tested. A theory can be rejected if it makes a deterministic prediction that is not ob-
served in the data. Nevertheless, in economics and several other disciplines, theories
regularly make probabilistic forecasts that attach strictly positive probability to all
outcomes. This leads to the basic question of how to test probabilistic theories. If a
blunt contradiction between a theory and data is impossible, then the standard proce-
dure is to employ large data sets so that any theory must attribute small probability
to some events which, if observed, induce a rejection of the theory. It is, however,
essential which low-probability events should be regarded as suﬃciently incompatible
with the theory to validate its rejection.
Assume that the problem at hand requires an understanding of a stochastic process
which generates an outcome that can be either 0 or 1. Before any data is observed, a
potential expert named Bob delivers a theory, deﬁned as a probability measure P on
the space of inﬁnite histories. Bob may be an informed expert who truthfully reveals
the data-generating process. Bob may also be a false expert who knows nothing about
the data-generating process.
A tester named Alice tests Bob’s theory P by selecting an event AP (a set of
outcome sequences) that she regards as consistent with the theory, and its complement
Ac
P as inconsistent with it. Assume that P assigns high probability to AP, i.e.,
P(AP) ≥ 1 − ε. (1.1)
Then, if Bob’s theory coincides with the data-generating process, it will not be re-
jected with probability 1 − ε. When equation (1.1) is satisﬁed, we say that Alice’s
test accepts the data-generating process with probability 1 − ε.
Av a s te ﬀort has been devoted to suppling results that take the form of equation
(1.1). These results (such as the law of large numbers, the law of iterated logarithmic,
and the central limit theorem) relate the unobservable concept of a theory P with a
potentially observable event AP.E a c ho ft h e s eﬁndings can be used to deﬁne a test
2that accepts the data-generating process. So, many tests are available to Alice.
Alice’s task of ﬁnding a suitable test is related to the classical problem in statistics
called a goodness-of-ﬁt test problem: Given a process P and some data, a tester must
determine if it is plausible that the data came from the process P. The tester must
make sure that if P does, in fact, run the data, then P is not rejected. As usual in
statistics, a small probability of an incorrect rejection is allowed (i.e., 1.1 must hold).
However, it is essential for a test that it is capable of rejecting theories. There is only
a limited purpose in running a test if we know from the outset that the theory will
not be rejected.
The possibility of theory rejection is seemingly assured if, for any theory P,t h e
complement of AP is non-empty. Then, no matter which theory Bob announces, there
is at least one path that, if realized, rejects Bob’s theory. However, recent literature
shows that, for several natural tests, a strategic expert can avoid rejection, no matter
how the data evolves in the future. This can accomplished even if the test is such
that for any theory P, the complement of AP is non-empty. Assume that, before any
data is observed, Bob uses a random device ζ to select his theory P.S u p p o s et h a t
for any sequence of outcomes Bob’s theory P will not be rejected with arbitrarily
high probability, according to Bob’s randomization device ζ. No matter which data
are realized, Alice will accept Bob’s theory (unless Bob had an unlucky draw from
ζ which is, by deﬁnition, nearly impossible). If such a device ζ can be constructed,
the test is said to be manipulable.B y d e ﬁnition, manipulable tests cannot dismiss
strategic experts, even if the experts are completely uninformed (i.e., even if they
have no knowledge over which process runs the data).
The calibration test requires the empirical frequency of 1 to be close to p in the
periods in which 1 was forecasted with probability close to p. Foster and Vohra
(1998) show that the calibration test can be manipulated. Several extensions of
the calibration test have also been proven to be manipulable. (See, for example,
Fudenberg and Levine (1999), Lehrer (2001), and Sandroni, Smorodinsky, and Vohra
(2003).) Sandroni (2003), Vovk and Shafer (2005), Olszewski and Sandroni (2008)
3and Shmaya (2008) show general classes of manipulable tests.1
Dekel and Feinberg (2006) and Olszewski and Sandroni (2008a) show the existence
of a nonmanipulable test. However, these results do not determine how long it takes
to discredit (uninformed) strategic experts. Let us say that rejection can be delayed
for m periods if theories can be strategically generated at random in such a way that
for any sequence of outcomes, the realized theory will not be rejected before period
m with high probability according to the randomization device. We show that for
any period m, and for any test that accepts the data-generating process with high
probability, rejection can be delayed for m periods. Thus, Bob may not be able
to sustain forever a false reputation for knowing the stochastic process, but he can
maintain this false reputation within an arbitrarily long time horizon.
The main feature of this result is that no assumptions are placed on Alice’s test
(apart from its not rejecting the data-generating process). Even if Alice uses the
nonmanipulable tests from Olszewski and Sandroni (2008a) and Dekel and Feinberg
(2006), Bob can delay rejection for an arbitrarily long time, no matter which data
are observed.
This impossibility result motivates an extreme recourse: we assume that the class
of permissible theories is restricted and as a result some theories are excluded from
the outset. The set of permissible theories constitutes a paradigm. We assume that
a theory in the paradigm is likely to be accepted if it runs the data. Our impossibil-
ity results still hold as long as the paradigm is convex and compact (in the weak-*
topology). We show that a strategic expert is likely to pass the test, no matter which
process in the paradigm runs the data. The paradigm that comprises all theories is
convex and compact. Other paradigms, like those consisting of exchangeable pro-
cesses, are also convex and compact. So the main impossibility result holds when the
expert is allowed to announce any theory, and also when the expert must announce
a theory structured in the form of an exchangeable process.
1See Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006), Hart and Mas-Colell (2001), Lehrer and Solan (2003),
Rustichini (1999), Olszewski and Sandroni (2008b), and Kalai, Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1999) for
related work.
4H o w e v e r ,o u ri m p o s s i b i l i t yr e s u l td o e sn ot necessarily hold when the paradigm is
not convex. We show an example of a topologically large paradigm and an empirical
test, which accepts the data-generating process (provided that it is in the paradigm)
and which is failed by a false expert in bounded time. No matter how the false expert
randomizes, there exists at least one process in the paradigm such that, if the process
runs the data, then the expert is likely to fail the test. In this paradigm, all theories
are permitted except for those that are suﬃciently close to a given theory f. Hence,
if all that is known is that the data-generating process is in this paradigm, then the
data-generating process cannot be inferred from the data. Hence, with no additional
help, Alice cannot ﬁnd out which process runs the data.
So far, we have implicitly assumed that Bob knows Alice’s test (because Alice
presents a test before Bob announces his theory). We consider zero-sum games in
which Alice announces a test and Bob announces a theory simultaneously. Bob’s
payoﬀ is 1 if his theory is accepted and 0 of his theory is rejected. We show that this
game may have no equilibrium.
Turning to the case where Alice has unbounded data sets, the test in Olszewski
and Sandroni (2008a) has the property that no matter how Bob randomizes, failure
is inevitable on a set of outcome sequences that is topologically large. This suggests
that strategic experts often fails this test. This depends, however, on how the word
“often” is interpreted, because if we replace the topological interpretation with a
measure-theoretic one, then we obtain almost the opposite result. We show that
for any probability measure Q over outcome sequences, and for any test T that
accepts the data-generating process with high probability, Bob can ensure that his
randomly selected theory is unlikely to be rejected, on a set of outcome sequences
whose Q−measure is as close to 1 as he wishes. Hence, even with unbounded data
sets, strategic experts can be discredited only to a limited extent.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we introduce our main concepts.
In section 3, we show that strategic experts can delay rejection. In section 4, we
explore some routes around the basic impossibility theorem. Section 5 concludes the
paper. Proofs are in section 6.
52. Basic concepts
In each period one outcome, 0 or 1, is observed.2 Let Ω = {0,1}∞ be the set of all
paths, i.e., inﬁnite histories. A path s ∈ Ω is an extension of a history st ∈ {0,1}t if
the ﬁrst t outcomes of s coincide with the outcomes of st. In the opposite direction,
let s | t be the history st ∈ {0,1}t whose outcomes coincide with the ﬁrst t outcomes
of s.Acylinder with base on st is the set C(st) ⊂ {0,1}∞ of all inﬁnite extensions
of st.L e t=t be the algebra that consists of all ﬁnite unions of cylinders with base on
{0,1}t. Denote by N the set of natural numbers. Let = be the σ-algebra generated
by the algebra =0 ≡
S
t∈N
=t, i.e., = is the smallest σ−algebra which contains =0.
Let ∆(Ω) be the set of all probability measures on (Ω,=). We endow Ω with the
product topology (i.e., the topology that comprises unions of cylinders with a ﬁnite
base) and ∆(Ω) with the weak*-topology and with the σ−algebra of Borel sets (i.e.,
the smallest σ−algebra which contains all open sets in weak*-topology).3 Let ∆∆(Ω)
be the set of probability measures on ∆(Ω).
Before any data are observed, an expert named Bob announces a probability
measure P ∈ ∆(Ω) which (Bob claims) describes how Nature will generate the data.
To simplify the language, we call a probability measure a theory.A t e s t e r n a m e d
Alice tests Bob’s theory empirically.
Deﬁnition 1. At e s ti saf u n c t i o nT : Ω × ∆(Ω) → {0,1}.
That is, a test is deﬁned as an arbitrary function that takes as input a theory and
a path, and returns a verdict that is 0 or 1. When the test returns a 1, it does not
reject (or, simply, it accepts) the theory. When a 0 is returned, the theory is rejected.
2Our results generalize to any ﬁnite number of outcomes per period.
3The weak*-topology consists of all unions of ﬁnite intersections of sets of the form
©
Q ∈ ∆(Ω):




where E stands for the expected-value operator, P ∈ ∆(Ω), ε>0, and h is a real-valued and
continuous function on Ω. See Rudin (1973).
6Any test divides paths into those in AP ≡ {s ∈ Ω| T(s,P)=1 }, where the theory
P is accepted; and those in Ac
P, where the theory is rejected. The set AP is called
the acceptance set, and its complement Ac
P is called the rejection set. We consider
only tests T such that the acceptance sets AP are =−measurable.
Deﬁnition 2. At e s tT rejects a theory P ∈ ∆(Ω) on a ﬁnite history st ∈ {0,1}t
(denoted T(st,P)=0 )i fT(s,P)=0for all paths s that extend st.O t h e r w i s e ,t h e
theory P passes the test on the history st, which is denoted T(st,P)=1 .
A test thus rejects a theory on a ﬁnite history st if it rejects the theory on all
paths s such that the ﬁrst t outcomes of s coincide with the corresponding outcomes
of st. Given any test T and a period m,l e tTm : Ω×∆(Ω) → {0,1} be the test such
that
Tm(s,P)=1i fa n do n l yi fT(sm,P)=1 ,s m = s | m.
That is, Tm rejects theory P on s if and only if the test T rejects P on the ﬁrst m
observations of s.B yd e ﬁnition, Tm rejects or accepts a theory at period m.
Some theories may be rejected out of hand (i.e., on all histories). The permissible
theories constitute a set Λ ⊆ ∆(Ω), called a paradigm. The excluded theories are
those in Λc, the complement of Λ. A paradigm can consist of theories that can be
eﬃciently computed or theories suﬃciently diﬀerent from a given theory (perhaps
produced by another expert).4
Fix any ε ∈ [0,1].
Deﬁnition 3. At e s tT accepts any data-generating process in the paradigm Λ with
probability 1 − ε if for any P ∈ Λ,
P (AP) > 1 − ε.
4See Fortnow and Vohra (2006) for results on testing experts with computational bounds, and
Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2008) and Feinberg and Stewart (2008) for results on testing multiple
experts.
7A test thus accepts any data-generating process in the paradigm Λ if any process
in Λ that actually generates the data is likely to pass the test.
Bob is allowed to select his theory P at random. Before any data are observed,
Bob may select a theory P according to a probability measure ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω); we call ζ
a random generator of theories.
Deﬁnition 4. Fix a test T. Given a random generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω) and
ε ≥ 0, let Rε
ζ ⊆ Ω be the set of all paths s ∈ Ω such that
ζ {P ∈ ∆(Ω) | T(s,P)) = 0} ≥ 1 − ε.
The set Rε
ζ is called the revelation set; it comprises the paths on which the random
generator of theories ζ fails the test with probability 1 − ε. If a test is such that,
for some ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω),R ε
ζ is empty, then that test is said to be manipulable with
probability ε. If a test accepts any data-generating process in ∆(Ω) with probability
1 − ε, and that test is such that, for all ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω),R ε
ζ is non-empty, then the test
is said to be ε−eﬀective.S o ,i fat e s ti sε−eﬀective, then no matter how the expert
randomizes, there exists at least one path that, if observed, rejects the expert with
probability 1 − ε. Hence, eﬀective tests are those for which it is feasible to reject an
uninformed, but strategic, expert.
Given ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω)a n dP ∈ ∆(Ω), let Pxζ be product measure on Ωx∆(Ω).
Deﬁnition 5. Rejection by a test T and a paradigm Λ can be delayed for m periods
with probability 1−ε if there exists a random generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω) such
that for every theory ˜ P ∈ Λ,
˜ Pxζ {(s,P) ∈ Ωx∆(Ω) | T
m(s,P)=1 } ≥ 1 − ε.
Deﬁnition 6. Rejection by a test T and a paradigm Λ can be arbitrarily delayed
with probability 1 − ε if it can be delayed for m periods, with probability 1 − ε, for
every m ∈ N.
8If rejection can be arbitrarily delayed, then Bob can ﬁrst choose an arbitrary
period m and randomly select theories such that, with high probability (according to
Bob’s randomization), he will pass the test up to period m, no matter which process
in the paradigm Λ runs the data. Conversely, rejection by a test T and paradigm Λ
cannot be delayed for m periods with probability ε if for any random generator of
theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω), there exists a theory ¯ P ∈ Λ such that
¯ Pxζ {(s,P) ∈ Ωx∆(Ω) | T
m(s,P)=1 } <ε .
3. Impossibility result
Proposition 1. Fix ε ∈ [0,1] and δ ∈ (0,1 − ε]. Let Λ be a convex, compact
paradigm. Let T be an arbitrary test that accepts any data-generating process in the
paradigm Λ with probability 1 − ε. Then, rejection by the test T and the paradigm
Λ can be arbitrarily delayed with probability 1 − ε − δ.
Proposition 1 shows that Bob can maintain a false reputation for knowing the
data-generating process for an arbitrarily long time horizon. No matter which test
Alice uses (as long as it accepts any data-generating process in a convex, compact
paradigm Λ) and no matter which process in the paradigm Λ actually runs the data,
Alice’s test will accept Bob’s theory within any given time frame. Now, assume that
Bob decides on a very large number at period 0. Bob can pass Alice’s test unless
Alice’s data set is so large that it contains more entries than the number Bob decided
on at period 0.
T h ef o c u so ft h ee x p e r tl i t e r a t u r eh a sb e e no nt h ep a r a d i g mo fa l lt h e o r i e s∆(Ω).
It is well-known that ∆(Ω) is convex and compact (in the weak*-topology). Hence, it
follows from proposition 1 that if the test T passes any data-generating process with
high probability, then rejection by the test T can be arbitrarily delayed with high
probability, no matter how the data evolves in the future.
The set of all exchangeable processes is also convex and compact. Hence, even if
the expert is restricted to announcing a theory structured in the form of an exchange-
able process, and even if the expert is completely ignorant of which exchangeable
9process runs the data, the expert can still arbitrarily delay rejection (provided that
the test passes any exchangeable process that generates the data).
If we compare proposition 1 and the results in Dekel and Feinberg (2006) and
Olszewski and Sandroni (2008a) which demonstrate the existence of eﬀective tests,
an interesting discontinuity is revealed. Suppose that Alice uses any eﬀective test and
Bob is an uninformed expert. By proposition 1, for any m, Bob can use a random gen-
erator of theories ˆ ζm to delay rejection for m periods. A limit ˆ ζ of (a subsequence of)
these random generators of theories exists (because ∆∆(Ω) is compact in the weak*-
topology). Since the test is eﬀective, the limit ˆ ζ cannot delay rejection indeﬁnitely.
Moreover, it can also be shown that given any δ>0, ˆ ζ does not delay rejection for m
periods with probability δ,i fm is suﬃciently large. Thus, the diﬀerence between ˆ ζm
and ˆ ζ becomes arbitrarily small as m increases, but a change from ˆ ζm to ˆ ζ triggers an
abrupt change in delaying rejection; the rejection delay which was formerly assured
on all paths with arbitrarily high probability, is no longer assured on at least some
paths even with small probability. Therefore, to delay rejection, Bob must choose the
random generator of theories in a very precise way.
3.1. Comparison with the literature
Proposition 1 diﬀers fundamentally from the results we ﬁnd in the existing literature.
All previous contributions, place restrictions on which tests Alice can use (apart from
not rejecting the data-generating process). Sandroni (2003) restricts attention to tests
that accept any data-generating process uniformly with m data points. In addition, in
this contribution, Alice is not allowed to use all the information available in a theory,
but only the forecasts made along the observed history. This second restriction is
also imposed in Vovk and Shafer (2005) and Shmaya (2008), and a similar restriction
is imposed in Olszewski and Sandroni (2008) . As a result, Alice is not permitted
to use several tests that would otherwise be available, such as those in Dekel and
Feinberg (2006) or Olszewski and Sandroni (2008a). Thus, the results in the existing
literature do not assure that Bob can delay rejection (as long as Alice’s test accepts
any data-generating process). This is demonstrated in proposition 1.
103.2. Sketch of the proof of proposition 1
The proof of proposition 1 relies on a result from Olszewski and Sandroni (2008a).
Call a test ﬁnite, if for ever P, both the rejection set Ac
P and the acceptance set AP
are open. Olszewski and Sandroni (2008a) show that ﬁnite tests (that accept the
data-generating process) can be manipulated.5 Here is the intuition for this result:
Consider a ﬁnite test ¯ T.L e t V : Λ × ∆(Λ) −→ [0,1] be a function deﬁned
by V (P,ζ)=EPEζ ¯ T, i.e., V (P,ζ) is the probability of the verdict 1 if P is the
data-generating process and ζ is the random generator of theories used by Bob. By
assumption, for every P ∈ Λ there exists ζP ∈ ∆(Λ) (a deterministic generator of
theories that assigns probability 1 to P)s u c ht h a tV (P,ζP) ≥ 1 − ε. Thus, if the
conditions of Fan’s minmax theorem are satisﬁed, then there exists as well ζ ¯ T ∈
∆∆(Ω)s u c ht h a tV (P,ζ ¯ T) ≥ 1 − ε − δ for every P ∈ Λ. The assumption that the
test is ﬁnite guarantees that V is a continuous function of P. All other conditions
of Fan’s minmax theorem (Fan (1953)) are satisﬁed.
Now consider an arbitrary test T.T h et e s tT m is ﬁnite for every period m,a n d
accepts any data-generating process. Hence, for each test Tm, there exists a random
generator of theories ζm that is likely to pass the test Tm, no matter which process
in Λ generates the data. So, by the construction of the test Tm, rejection by the test
T can be delayed for m periods.
4. Ways around the impossibility result
Proposition 1 shows that no test (that passes any data-generating process in a con-
vex, compact paradigm Λ) can dismiss a strategic expert with bounded data sets.
Proposition 1 is an impossibility result, which provides motivation for investigating
ways to get around it. We consider three possible routes. In section 4.1, we consider
nonconvex paradigms. In section 4.2 we relax the (implicit) assumption that Bob
knows Alice’s test. In section 4.3., we consider the case of unbounded data sets.
5Olszewski and Sandroni (2008a) prove that a slightly larger class of tests is manipulable. How-
ever, for the purposes of the present paper, we need to know only that ﬁnite tests are manipulable.
114.1. Non-convex paradigms
It is fairly easy to see that proposition 1 does not extend to the case of non-convex
paradigms.
• Consider a paradigm ΛD = {P1,P 2} with two theories. Suppose that there exist
disjoint sets AP1 and AP2 satisfying (1.1), and comprising histories of length m.
(It is straightforward to produce examples of two theories and two sets with
these properties.) Let T be the test such that AP1 and AP2 are the acceptance
sets of P1 and P2, respectively, and all other theories are rejected on all paths.
Then, T accepts any data-generating process in paradigm ΛD,a n di ft h ee x p e r t
does not pick the actual data-generating process, he fails T with probability
1 − ε. Also, every random generator of theories must assign less than a 0.5
chance to one of the theories in ΛD. As a result, rejection by this test and
paradigm ΛD cannot be delayed for m periods with probability higher than
0.5+0 .5ε.
The paradigm ΛD consisting of only two theories is in striking contrast with the
paradigm Λ = ∆(Ω) of all possible theories. In the latter case, rejection can be
arbitrarily delayed. In the former case, it cannot. One might wonder whether this
diﬀerence arises the fact that the paradigm ΛD is small, whereas the paradigm Λ =
∆(Ω) is large. Nevertheless, we will now construct a more elaborate example in which
rejection cannot be delayed even though theories are restricted to a (topologically)
large paradigm.
4.1.1. A large nonconvex paradigm
Given a theory P ∈ ∆(Ω), ap a t hs ∈ Ω, and st = s | t such that P(C(st)) > 0, let
f
P





be forecasts made along s.
12Given δ ∈ (0, 0.25) and m ∈ N,l e tΛm,δ ⊆ ∆(Ω) be the paradigm of theories P









The paradigm Λm,δ excludes theories forecasting 1 and 0 with near equal odds
suﬃciently often. Let ¯ P be the theory that always forecasts 1 with probability 0.5.




1i f P ∈ Λm,δ and P(C(sm)) ≥ K ¯ P(C(sm)), sm = s | m;
0o t h e r w i s e .
)
The test Tβ passes a theory P from the paradigm Λm,δ on all histories along which
P is found K times more likely than ¯ P. In particular, Tβ(s,P)=0i fP(C(sm)) = 0.
Theories outside the paradigm are rejected. Let e Λm,δ be the set of theories P ∈ Λm,δ
such that P(C(sm)) > 0 for any cylinder C(sm), i.e., theories never predicting up to
period m any outcome with certainty.
Proposition 2. For any ε>0,δ∈ (0,.25),a n dK ∈ N, there exists a period ¯ m ∈ N
such that if m ≥ ¯ m, then:
1) The test Tβ passes any data-generating process in paradigm Λm,δ with probability
1 − ε.
2) Rejection by a test T β and paradigm Λm,δ cannot be delayed for m periods with
probability ε.
In addition, the set e Λm,δ ⊂ Λm,δ is an open subset of ∆(Ω), and given any theory
P ∈ ∆(Ω)a n dan e i g h b o r h o o dU of P,t h e r ee x i s tˆ m ∈ N and a theory Q such
that Q ∈ U ∩ e Λm,δ for every m ≥ ˆ m.
Assume that Alice will eventually have m data points at her disposal and that she
tests Bob with the test Tβ. Also assume that the data-generating process belongs to
the paradigm Λm,δ (and that this is known to Alice and Bob). If informed, Bob knows
13which process in the paradigm Λm,δ generates the data. But if Bob is uninformed, he
does not know which process in the paradigm Λm,δ generates the data. Proposition 2
shows that if Bob is informed, he is likely to pass Tβ. If uninformed, Bob cannot be
assured that he will arbitrarily delay rejection, because no matter how he randomizes,
for some theories inside the paradigm, he fails the test with high probability. In
addition, proposition 2 shows that e Λm,δ is an open set and that any open set intersects
e Λm,δ if m is suﬃciently large. Hence, the sets Λm,δ become topologically large, if m
becomes large. That is, even if Alice and Bob are relatively ill-informed (i.e., they
only know that the data-generating process belongs to a topologically large set), then
it is not possible for Bob, without additional information, to be nearly certain that
rejection can be arbitrarily delayed.
Notice that if Bob announces the data-generating process, then Alice beneﬁts from
Bob’s announcement. Given that she only knows that the actual process belongs to
Λm,δ, she would not be able to infer the process from the data without additional
information.
4.1.2. Intuition of proposition 2
The paradigm Λm,δ excludes the theory ¯ P and other theories which forecast 1 and
0 with near equal odds suﬃciently often. Hence, the paradigm Λm,δ excludes only a
relatively small set of theories. It is therefore intuitive that the paradigm Λm,δ is a
topologically large set. The intuition for parts 1 and 2 of proposition 2 is as follows:
Consider a theory P that belongs to the paradigm Λm,δ. The histories to which P
assigns a suﬃciently higher likelihood than ¯ P does have a high probability, according
to P.B yd e ﬁnition, if Bob announces P, then he passes the test Tβ on paths to which
P assigns a suﬃciently higher likelihood than ¯ P does. So if the actual data-generating
process is P, then Bob is likely to pass Tβ.
On the other hand, if Bob announces theory P, he fails the test on the histo-
ries to which ¯ P assigns a suﬃciently higher likelihood than P does. The histories
with this property have a high probability according to ¯ P. Assume that ¯ P is the
data-generating process. Then, no matter which theory P (in the paradigm) Bob
14announces, he fails the test with high probability (according to ¯ P). Theories outside
the paradigm are rejected out of hand.
Hence, no matter which random generator of theories ζ Bob uses, he must an-
nounce a theory which fails the test with high probability (according to ¯ P). By
Fubini’s theorem, there exists a history s such that Bob is likely to fail test Tβ on s
(according to ζ). Now consider a theory ˆ P in the paradigm Λm,δ that assigns high
probability to s (for example, a Dirac measure centered at s). It follows that if
ˆ P ∈ Λm,δ is the data-generating process, then Bob is likely to fail test Tβ.
4.2. Simultaneous moves
The analysis considered so far could be embedded in a game where Alice moves ﬁrst
and presents a test. After observing Alice’s test, Bob announces a theory. Finally,
Nature produces the data. This zero-sum game between Alice and Bob can be deﬁned
as follows: Fix any arbitrary m ∈ N. Given ε>0, let Υ(ε) be the set of all tests
that pass any data-generating process with probability 1 − ε. Alice chooses a test
T ∈ Υ(ε) and Bob chooses a random generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω). Bob’s payoﬀ
is
Vm(ζ,T)= i n f
sm∈{0,1}mζ {P ∈ ∆(Ω) | T(sm,P)=1 }. (4.1)
That is, Bob’s payoﬀ is the probability that his theory will pass the test at period
m, computed under a worse-case scenario over the outcome sequences that Nature
might produce. By proposition 1, if Alice moves ﬁrst, then Bob can assure him a
payoﬀ close arbitrarily close to 1 − ε. Now, assume that Alice can select a test at
random by θ ∈ ∆(Υ(ε)). An argument entirely analogous to the one presented in
the proof of proposition 1 shows that for every mixed strategy of Alice, there exists
a strategy of Bob that also assures him a payoﬀ close to 1 − ε. T h a ti s ,f o ra n y
θ ∈ ∆(Υ(ε)) and δ ∈ (0,1 − ε], there exists ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω) such that
inf
sm∈{0,1}mE
θζ {P ∈ ∆(Ω) | T(sm,P)=1 } (4.2)
is greater than 1 − ε − δ. Hence, if Bob correctly anticipates Alice’s mixed strategy,
then Alice cannot determine whether Bob has any relevant knowledge about the
15data-generating process.
Now consider a zero-sum game in which (uninformed) Bob and Alice move simul-
taneously so that theories and tests are announced at the same time. Bob’s payoﬀs
are given by either (4.1) or (4.2), depending on whether Alice is allowed to randomize.
A l i c e ’ sp u r es t r a t e g i e ss e ti sΥ(ε). This game may have no equilibrium.
Example 1. Fix ε =5 /8 and m =2 . For any random generator of theories ζ ∈
∆∆(Ω) there is a test Tζ such that Bob’s payoﬀ V2(ζ,Tζ) i ss m a l l e rt h a no re q u a lt o
2/8.
The proof of this example is in section 6. By proposition 1, if Bob properly
anticipates Alice’s strategy, then he ensures himself at least a payoﬀ close to 3/8.
By example 1, if Alice can properly anticipate Bob’s strategy, then Bob gets at
most 2/8. H e n c e ,t h eg a m eh a sn oe q u i l i b r i u m . I nc o n t r a s tt ot h ec a s eo fak n o w n
probability distribution over tests, these results imply that Bob, if uninformed, cannot
simultaneously pass all tests from Υ(5/8) with probability arbitrarily close to 3/8.
4.3. Eﬀectiveness bound
We return to the case in which Alice announces the test ﬁrst, but we now assume that
she has unbounded data sets at her disposal. By deﬁnition, if Bob uses a random
generator of theories ζ, then he fails the test with probability 1−ε, on the revelation
set Rε
ζ. These revelation sets are empty for some random generator of theories ζ in
the case of the calibration test or other manipulable tests. In contrast, for the Dekel
and Feinberg (2006) test, the revelation sets are uncountable (even for ε =0 )f o ra n y
random generator of theories ζ. For this latter test, the revelation sets are large in a
set-theoretic sense. And if we consider the test in Olszewski and Sandroni (2008a),
the complement of the revelation sets (also for ε =0 )a r eB a i r e ’ sﬁrst-category sets.
For this test, then, the revelation sets are large in a topological sense.6
6First-category sets are often described as topologically small. However, there are other deﬁni-
tions of small sets that we have not examined here (see Anderson and Zame (2001) and Stinchcombe
(2001)).
16It would be desirable to extend these results by showing a test with revelation sets
that are large in a measure-theoretic sense, i.e., revelation sets that are guaranteed to
have nonnegligible measure according to a given probability measure. However, this
is not possible, as we will now show.
Given a random generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω), let A
1−ε
ζ ⊆ Ω be the set of
paths such that
ζ{P ∈ ∆(Ω):T(s,P)=1 } > 1 − ε. (4.3)
The set A
1−ε
ζ comprises the paths on which the random generator of theories ζ
passes the test with probability greater than 1 − ε. These sets are called ζ−approval
sets.
Proposition 3. Fix a probability measure Q ∈ ∆(Ω). Fix also any real numbers
ε ∈ (0,1] and δ ∈ (0,1 − ε]. Consider a test T that passes any data-generating
process with probability 1 − ε. For every real number ν>0, there exists a random
generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω) such that
Q(A
1−ε−δ
ζ ) ≥ 1 − ν. (4.4)
Proposition 3 shows that given any probability measure, Bob can ensure that his
theories will pass the test on approval sets that have high probability according to
this probability measure. This result holds no matter which test Alice uses (and no
matter how much data she has) provided that the test passes any data-generating
process.
H e r ei sas k e t c ho ft h ep r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 :C o n s i d e ra na r b i t r a r yt e s tT that
is likely to accept any data-generating process. The test T can be approximated by
a ﬁnite test T such that the diﬀerences between the rejection sets Ac
P of T and T,
respectively, are small according to probability measure Q.S i n c eT is a ﬁnite test, it
is manipulable.
Any random generator of theories ζ that passes T on all paths can fail T only on
speciﬁcp a t h ss;n a m e l y ,ζ must assign a large measure to probability measures P for
which s belongs to the diﬀerence between the rejection sets Ac
P of T and T.T h e s e t
17of these paths s must, however, be small according to probability measure Q,b yt h e
property deﬁning the test T and Fubini’s theorem.
Remark 1. It is straightforward to modify the proof of Proposition 3 to obtain this
slightly stronger result: For every ﬁnite family of probability measures Q, there exists
a random generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω) satisfying (4.4) for every Q ∈ Q.
5. Conclusion
If an empirical examiner plans to reject false theories, then it must be possible for
her to reject theories which are based on no relevant knowledge. Empirical tests with
this property are nonmanipulable tests. Any test that accepts the data-generating
process is susceptible to strategic manipulation for arbitrarily long periods of time.
Even if a tester has arbitrarily large data sets at her disposal, she will only be able
to discredit a strategic expert in a limited sense.
It is possible to arbitrarily delay rejection even if one knows from the outset that
the data-generating process belongs to a convex, compact paradigm such as the class
of all exchangeable processes. However, it may not be possible to arbitrarily delay
rejection if theories forecastin g1a n d0w i t hn e a re q u a lo d d ss u ﬃciently often are
excluded.
6. Proofs
The proofs apply an assertion from Olszewski and Sandroni (2008a). It is convenient
to restate that assertion here:
Deﬁnition 7. Finite tests of length m are deﬁned by the property that for any theory
P ∈ ∆(Ω), the rejection set Ac
P is a union of cylinders with base on histories of length
t ≤ m. A test is called ﬁnite if it is a ﬁnite test on length m for some m ∈ N.
18Note that a ﬁnite test of length m can be equivalently deﬁned by the property
that for any theory P ∈ ∆(Ω), the acceptance set AP is a union of cylinders with
base on histories of length t ≤ m.
Proposition 5 from Olszewski and Sandroni (2008a). Fix any ε ∈ (0,1]
and δ ∈ (0,1 − ε]. Let Λ be a convex, compact paradigm. Let T be an arbitrary test
that accepts the data-generating process in the paradigm Λ with probability 1 − ε.
Then, there exists a random generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω)s u c ht h a tf o re v e r y
theory ˜ P ∈ Λ,
˜ Pxζ {(s,P) ∈ Ωx∆(Ω) | T(s,P)=1 } ≥ 1 − ε − δ.
7
Proof of proposition 1: Fix any period m. By proposition 5 in Olszewski and
Sandroni (2008a), there exists a random generator of theories ζT,m such that for every
˜ P ∈ Λ,
˜ PxζT,m{(s,P) ∈ Ωx∆(Ω) | T
m(s,P)=0 } ≤ ε + δ.
Let sm be any ﬁnite history from {0,1}m such that T(sm,P)=0 . By deﬁnition,
C(sm) ⊆ Ac
P and therefore C(sm) ⊆ (Am
P )
c. In other words, T(sm,P) = 0 implies
that Tm (sm,P)=0 . Thus,
{P ∈ ∆(Ω):T (sm,P)=0 } ⊆ {P ∈ ∆(Ω):T
m (sm,P)=0 },
and so for every ˜ P ∈ Λ, ˜ PxζT,m{(s,P) ∈ Ωx∆(Ω) | T(sm,P)=0 } ≤ ε + δ.¥
We now state and prove three lemmas that will be used in the proof of proposition
2.
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2 for every p ∈ [0,1].











With some algebra, it follows that E1(p) is a positive function (on [0,1]) and zero
if and only if p =0 .5. Taking l’Hospital’s rule, twice it follows that
E1(p)





2 if p =0 .5
E1(p)
(p−0.5)2 if p 6=0 .5
)
.
Hence, J(p) is a continuous and strictly positive function (on [0,1]); in particular,
J(p) is a bounded away from zero on [0,1].











is also a positive function (on [0,1]) and zero if and only if p =0 .5. Moreover,
E2(p)
(p − 0.5)2 −→
p→0.5 2.
¥
Let EP and VA R P be the expectation and variance operator associated with P ∈
∆(Ω). Let (Xi)∞
i=1 be a sequence of random variables such that Xi is =i-measurable
and its expectation conditional on =i−1 is zero (i.e., EP {Xi |= i−1} = 0). Moreover,
the sequence of conditional variances VA R P {Xi |= i−1} are uniformly bounded (i.e.,








Lemma 2. For every ε0 > 0 and j ∈ N, there exists ¯ m(j,ε0) ∈ N such that
P
µ½




> 1 − ε
0.
20Proof: By deﬁnition, Sm is a martingale. By Kolmogorov’s inequality (see
Shiryaev (1996), Chapter IV, §2), for any δ>0,
P
µ½



























































0 (for a suﬃciently large m
∗).
Let ¯ m(j,ε0)=2 m∗ for this suﬃciently large m∗. By deﬁnition,
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> 1 − ε
0.
¥




















and ¯ Zt = Zt − E
P {Zt |= t−1}.
21Lemma 3. Given K ∈ N, ε>0,a n dδ>0, there exists ¯ m such that if m ≥ ¯ m,t h e n
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Take any j ≥ 2κ/δ and ¯ m(j,ε)a sd e ﬁned in Lemma 2. Next, take ˆ m ≥ ¯ m(j,ε)s u c h



































and this last probability is greater than 1 − ε by Lemma 2. This demonstrates the
ﬁrst part of Lemma 3. The proof of the second part of Lemma 3 is analogous to the
proof of the ﬁr s tp a r t .L e tu sd e ﬁne
Wt(s)=−Zt(s)a n d ¯ Wt = Wt − E

















¯ P {Wt |= t−1}.






























Zt(s) < log(K) ⇐⇒
m X
t=1
































> 1 − ε.
The proof is now concluded by deﬁning ¯ m as max{e m, ˆ m}.¥
Lemma 4. For any ε>0,δ>0,a n dK ∈ N, there exists a period ¯ m ∈ N such that
if m ≥ ¯ m, then the test Tβ accepts a data-generating process in Λm,δ with probability
1 − ε.M o r e o v e r ,i fm ≥ ¯ m, then for any random generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω),
¯ Pxζ
©



























B yL e m m a3( p a r t1 ) ,i fm ≥ ¯ m,t h e nTβ accepts any data-generating process in
Λm,δ with probability 1−ε.By Lemma 3 (part 2), if m ≥ ¯ m, then for every P ∈ Λm,δ,
¯ P
©
s ∈ Ω | T
β(s,P)=0
ª
> 1 − ε.
In addition, Tβ(s,P)=0i fP ∈ (Λm,δ)




≤ ε for every P ∈ ∆(Ω).























Proof of proposition 2: Part 1) of proposition 2 is shown in lemma 4. Part 2)
of proposition 2 follows from lemma 4 because if (6.1) holds, then E
¯ PEζ{Tβ} ≤ ε.
So there must exist at least one path ˜ s ∈ Ω such that Eζ{Tβ(˜ s,P)} ≤ ε. It follows
that the theories produced by ζ fail Tβ with probability 1−ε, provided that the data
is given by ˜ s; or, equivalently, that ˜ s is produced by the Dirac measure that assigns
full measure to ˜ s. If δ<0.25, then any Dirac measure is in Λm,δ.
The ﬁnal part of proposition 2 can be shown as follows:
We shall show ﬁr s tt h a tt h es e te Λm,δ is open. Take any probability measure
P ∈ e Λm,δ.F o ra n ys ∈ Ω and t ≤ m,d e ﬁne functions hs,t : Ω → R by






¯ ¯ <ε t, (6.2)
then the measures assigned by P and Q to the cylinder C(st) are closer than εt.
It suﬃces to pick (suﬃciently small) numbers εt recursively in order to guarantee




t−1(s) are arbitrarily close, which (by deﬁnition) implies
that Q ∈ e Λm,δ.
We shall now show that given any theory P ∈ ∆(Ω) and any neighborhood U of
P,t h e r ee x i s tˆ m ∈ N and a theory Q such that Q ∈ U ∩ e Λm,δ for every m ≥ ˆ m.
With no loss of generality, assume that P(C(sm)) > 0 for any cylinder C(sm). Take
continuous functions h1,...,hl : Ω → R, and positive real numbers ε1,...,εl. It follows
from the continuity of h1,...,hl and the compactness of Ω that there exists a (large
enough) k ∈ N such that
rk = sk =⇒∀ i=1,...,l |hi(r) − hi(s)| <ε i.
Thus, if two probability measures P and Q have the property that






¯ ¯ <ε i.
Take a probability measure Q satisfying (6.3) and the following property: for any
s ∈ Ω and t = k +1 ,...,m − 1,
f
Q






Then, by (6.4), Q ∈ Λm,δ if m is suﬃciently large; by (6.3) and (6.4), Q(C(sm)) >
0 for any cylinder C(sm), and so Q ∈ e Λm,δ. Finally, by (6.3), Q belongs to the
neighborhood of the probability measure P determined by h1,...,h l and ε1,...,εl.¥
P r o o fo fe x a m p l e1 :Fix any ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω). Given any history i ∈ {0,1}2,l e t
Ti ∈ Υ(5/8) be the test such that Ti(j,P)=1f o re v e r yj ∈ {0,1}2,j6= i;Ti(i,P)=1
if P(C(i)) ≥ 5/8, and Ti(i,P)=0i fP(C(i)) < 5/8. Let Di ⊆ ∆(Ω)b et h es e to f
25theories P such that P(C(i)) ≥ 5/8. Clearly, Dl and Dk are disjoint sets, l 6= k.S o ,
for some ¯ ı ∈ {0,1}2, V2(ζ,T¯ ı)=ζ(D¯ ı) ≤ 2/8.¥
Proof of proposition 3: Recall the following well-known result: for any given
probability measure P ∈ ∆(Ω)a n dδ>0, any set A ∈ = c a nb ee n l a r g e dt oa no p e n
set U ⊃ A such that P(U) <P(A)+δ (see Ulam’s Theorem, 7.1.4 in Dudley (1989)).
It implies that for every probability measure P, the rejection set Ac
P can be enlarged











P denote the union of those cylinders C ⊂ Bc
P w h o s eb a s eh a sl e n g t hn.F o r









Take any n with this property, and deﬁne a test T by
T(s,P)=0i ﬀ s ∈ B
n
P.
By (6.5), the test T accepts the data-generating process with probability 1 − ε −
δ/4. So, by proposition 5 in Olszewski and Sandroni (2008a), there exists a random
generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω) such that for every s ∈ Ω,
ζ{P ∈ ∆(Ω):T(s,P)=1 } > 1 − ε − δ/2.
It follows that condition (4.3) (where ε is replaced with ε + δ)m a yb ev i o l a t e d
only for paths s such that




P} >δ / 2. (6.6)
Thus, as Ac
P ⊂ Bc
P, {s ∈ Ω :( 4 . 3 )-b u tw i t hε+δ instead of ε -i sv i o l a t e d } ⊂ {s ∈ Ω :
( 6 . 6 )-b u tw i t hBc
P − Bn
P instead of Ac
P − Bn
P -i ss a t i s ﬁed}.
Let χS denote the indicator function of the set S, i.e., χS (s)=1i fs ∈ S,a n d
χS (s)=0o t h e r w i s e . T h em e a s u r eQ of the latter (and therefore, also the former)











26Indeed, this inequality follows from the fact that if for some s the set {P ∈ ∆(Ω):
s ∈ Bc
P − Bn










and if for some s the set {P ∈ ∆(Ω):s ∈ Bc
P − Bn
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